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Abstract
Biological weapons achieve their intended target effects through the infectivity of disease-causing infectious agents. The ability to use
biological agents in warfare is prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention. Bioterrorism is deﬁned as the deliberate release
of viruses, bacteria or other agents used to cause illness or death in people, but also in animals or plants. It is aimed at creating casualties,
terror, societal disruption, or economic loss, inspired by ideological, religious or political beliefs. The success of bioterroristic attempts is
deﬁned by the measure of societal disruption and panic, and not necessarily by the sheer number of casualties. Thus, making only a few
individuals ill by the use of crude methods may be sufﬁcient, as long as it creates the impact that is aimed for. The assessment of
bioterrorism threats and motives have been described before. Biocrime implies the use of a biological agent to kill or make ill a single
individual or small group of individuals, motivated by revenge or the desire for monetary gain by extortion, rather than by political,
ideological, religious or other beliefs. The likelihood of a successful bioterrorist attack is not very large, given the technical difﬁculties and
constraints. However, even if the number of casualties is likely to be limited, the impact of a bioterrorist attack can still be high. Measures
aimed at enhancing diagnostic and therapeutic capabilities and capacities alongside training and education will improve the ability of society
to combat ‘regular’ infectious diseases outbreaks, as well as mitigating the effects of bioterrorist attacks.
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Introduction
Outbreaks of infectious diseases pose a constant threat to
global health. Much attention is given to the emergence of
relatively new or unknown pathogens, e.g. Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus and Zaire ebolavirus. More
often, well-known pathogens such as poliovirus may lead to
epidemics. Most epidemics emerge because of external, often
climatological or geographical, factors. Sometimes, however,
human interference with nature inﬂuences the spread of
disease. Some zoonoses jump to a human host because the
rainforest habitat of former animal hosts is reduced. Defor-
estation of mountainous areas may also lead to ﬂooding of
populated areas, indirectly leading to outbreaks of cholera and
other infectious diseases.
A very special category of human-made outbreaks of
disease is the manipulation and distribution of pathogens with
the intention of disrupting societies. This may be part of
government policy in biological warfare (BW), but is also a
means used by terrorist groups or criminals. Although
sporadic, the deliberate use of biological agents can lead to
general anxiety. We aim to provide a very brief historical
overview of the use of biological agents in warfare and
terrorist or criminal activity, in the perspective of international
regulations, early detection strategies, and coordinated pre-
ventive activities. Subsequently, the requirements for deliber-
ate use of a potential biological agent are described, followed
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by a summary of lessons learnt from bio-agents used as such in
the past. We conclude with trends in, predominantly, bioter-
rorism, and propose a future approach to deal with an
unpredictable, but potentially highly disruptive, threat.
Biological Weapons and BW
The Geneva protocol, ratiﬁed as early as 1925 and currently
signed by 65 of 121 states, prohibits the development,
production and use in war of biological and chemical weapons
[1]. The WHO identiﬁed the threat of biological and chemical
warfare ofﬁcially in the midst of the Vietnam War and Cold
War, after UN resolution 2162B (XXI) was adopted in 1967,
condemning all actions contrary to the Geneva protocol. This
resulted in the 1970 WHO report ‘Health aspects of chemical
and biological weapons’, updated in 2004 [2] into WHO
guidance ‘Public health response to biological and chemical
weapons’. This WHO document focuses on detecting and
responding to unusual disease outbreaks. Important recom-
mendations are standardized surveillance and the provision of
adequate healthcare in cases of such emergencies. In the WHO
deﬁnition, biological weapons achieve their intended target
effects through the infectivity of disease-causing microorgan-
isms and other such entities, including viruses, infectious nucleic
acids, and prions. The 2004WHO guidance is mainly concerned
with the effects of such pathogens on human beings.
BW is carried out by nation states that seek to undermine
the will and abilities of an opponent to ﬁght back. Thus, they
may seek to kill or make ill large numbers of the opponent’s
armed forces, population, crops and livestock by the release of
biological agents.
Historically, until World War II, the number of soldiers
dying from disease far outweighed the number killed in combat
[3,4]. Although the numbers of soldiers dying from both
combat and disease have been much reduced by advances in
military healthcare and casualty extraction, morbidity in
relatively modern wars (95% of US hospital admissions in
World War II and 82% of those in the Korean war) has been
related to soldiers being incapacitated because of disease and
non-battle injuries rather than because of combat actions [3].
For example, malaria alone contributed to 56–75% of all
hospital admissions of US Forces in the Vietnam War [5]. It is
therefore not surprising that the impact of disease on the
ability of an opponent to ﬁght was recognized by the Romans
and probably before that, and BW has been carried out in the
past by trying to foster an outbreak. Some examples are the
catapulting of manure, bodies of dead plague victims or cattle
into besieged cities in medieval times, the distribution of
blankets from smallpox victims to the native American Indian
population in the eighteenth century, the use of shigella and
cholera organisms to poison wells, and the distribution of
plague-contaminated ﬂeas by Japanese troops in Manchuria and
China during World War II [6–8]. It is probable that examples
of retreating troops using dead animals or manure to poison
water sources can be found in any war. The discovery of the
pathogenic abilities of microorganisms in the 19th century by
Pasteur, Koch and others gave insights into the manner of
transmission of diseases. It led to the development of
industrial-scale microbiology and great advances in ways to
prevent and treat infectious diseases, with tremendous
beneﬁts for humankind. However, ironically, it also provided
insights into ways to misuse this knowledge.
Nowadays, being much less hampered by technical consid-
erations and only inhibited by international opinion or fear of
retaliation, nations have a wide number of options to carry out
an offensive biological weapons programme. From 1928, a
number of nations had offensive biological warfare pro-
grammes, and most likely some still do [9]. The USA (until
1972) and, most notably, the former Soviet Union (until 1992)
had large and highly developed biological warfare programmes.
Both nations developed ten or more agents, including toxins,
weaponized to kill or incapacitate humans and to destroy
crops and livestock [8,10,11]. The ability to use biological
agents in warfare is prohibited by the Biological and Toxin
Weapon Convention (BTWC). Since 1972, nations have not
been allowed to carry out research to develop biological
weapons, or to produce and stockpile them. The BTWC has
been signed and ratiﬁed by 170 nations. Having said that, the
BTWC has no inspection mechanisms, and a biological
weapons research and production programme is relatively
easy to hide within a nation’s biotechnological infrastructure.
Furthermore, the Biological Weapons Convention requires, in
Article I, of nations who have signed not to ‘develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other
biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have no justiﬁcation
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes’. As
such, the convention does not speciﬁcally deﬁne which agents
or toxins are prohibited, and what quantities would go beyond
the justiﬁcation. Regardless of whether or not nations have
ratiﬁed the BTWC, it is fairly certain that a number of rogue
nations or those willing to risk international outrage are
secretly carrying out BW research.
Bioterrorism and Biocrime
According to the CDC, bioterrorism is deﬁned as the
deliberate release of viruses, bacteria or other agents used
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to cause illness or death in people, and also in animals or plants
[12]. Bioterrorism aims to create casualties, terror, societal
disruption, or economic loss, inspired by ideological, religious
or political beliefs. It is carried out by terrorists, also called
non-state actors. Usually, terrorists seek to achieve their goal
through terror, caused by violence. Bioterrorism may also
cause this terror. The 2001 series of anthrax letters contam-
inated hundreds if not thousands of people, but caused only a
few casualties. However, the impact of this attack is still felt
today, through the number of powder letters and suspicious
packages regularly sent to public ofﬁces. Also, there are
apocalyptic groups such as Aum Shinrikyo that actually seek to
cause mass casualties to further their own goals. Terrorists
operate within the borders of a nation that may seek to
destroy them. The need to operate below the law enforce-
ment detection threshold and with relatively limited means
severely hampers their ability to develop, construct and deliver
a successful biological attack on a large scale. On the other
hand, success for most of them will most likely be deﬁned by
the amount of societal disruption and panic, and not neces-
sarily by the sheer number of casualties. Thus, making even
only a few individuals ill by using crude methods may be
sufﬁcient, as long as it creates the impact that is aimed for. The
assessment of bioterrorism threats and motives has been
described before [13–15].
Finally, there is biocrime. This implies the use of a biological
agent to kill or make ill a single individual or a small group of
individuals, motivated by revenge or monetary gain through
extortion, rather by than political, ideological, religious or other
beliefs. Examples are the use of, for example, ricin to get rid of a
partner, or the use in 1996 of Shigella dysenteriae by a disgruntled
hospital laboratory employee in making pastries as a gift for her
colleagues [16]. The murder of the Hungarian dissident Georgi
Markov in London in 1978 with a ricin-containing pellet injected
with an umbrella could be considered an act of biocrime.
However, as the murder was undoubtedly meant to convey a
message on behalf of the KGB to other dissidents, one might
equally argue that this is an example of state-driven BW.
Countering bioterrorism, from a responsive and pol-
icy-making point of view, usually focuses on measures to
mitigate human casualties. Without doubt, this part is essential,
and a simulation conducted by the Center for Nonprolifera-
tion Studies demonstrated that preparedness and being able to
respond efﬁciently may reduce the ultimate casualty ﬁgure by
75% [14]. However, bioterrorism might also be used to cause
signiﬁcant economic losses by infecting livestock or crops, or
contaminating buildings. Outbreaks of diseases such as foot
and mouth disease, rinderpest and Newcastle disease lead to
loss of the nation’s disease-free status and subsequent bans on
the export of animals, meat, and derived products, causing
signiﬁcant economic losses [17]. Although not an attack, the
foot and mouth disease outbreak in the UK in 2001 directly
affected the private and public sectors, with an estimated loss
of £8 billion [18]. The 2003 avian inﬂuenza outbreak in the
Netherlands resulted in a loss of nearly €800 million in direct
costs and loss of trade for the Dutch government and industry
[19]. The clean-up of various buildings involved after the 2001
anthrax letters costed the US government $320 million [20].
Although this kind of agroterrorism has not yet occurred, the
threat should be taken seriously, given the impact that it may
have.
Requirements for Potential Agents for Use
in Bioterrorism
The requirements for a biological attack are obtaining a
pathogenic organism or toxin, multiplying it in such a way that
the agent retains its viability and pathogenic attributes, and
developing a method whereby the agent can actually reach and
enter a human being in sufﬁcient quantities to cause disease.
Regarding the last of these, this means that the agents need to
be inhaled or swallowed by the target population, which
requires either aerosolization or covert distribution in food or
water. Thus, a vial containing an organism, even if it is
pathogenic, does not constitute a biological weapon. The Aum
Shinrikyo attack shows that, unless the technological hurdles
are successfully overcome, the outcome will be ‘a dud’.
Probably, the uncertainty in the outcome will act as a
deterrent for terrorists, and be a reason for them to use
more conventional weapons.
Those contemplating the commission of an act of bioter-
rorism can think of an array of organisms, which may be more
or less suited for this purpose. The traditional BW agents of
both the US and former Soviet biological weapon programmes
were chosen for this task after a long and careful selection
process that narrowed the long list of potentials down to a
few. The agents selected were considered to be suited for
causing mass casualties because they were found to share a
number of characteristics, namely:
1. High morbidity, and potentially highly lethal
2. Highly infectious or high toxicity (low ID50 or ICt50)
3. Suited for mass production and storage until delivery
without loss of pathogenic potential
4. Suited for methods aimed at wide-area delivery, and hardy
enough to withstand the delivery process
5. Relatively stable in the environment after dissemination for a
period long enough to infect humans
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6. Suitable for having the potential as a BW agent
improved by genetic engineering and weaponization pro-
cesses.
Terrorists, however, may not need the requirements for,
for example, long-term storage or mass delivery. This means
that they have a wider array of opportunities. However, ﬁrst of
all, agents must be available to them. Ricin, in particular, seems
to enjoy great popularity as an agent of choice, as suggested by
a long list of incidents or attempts [21], most likely because of
its toxicity and accessibility.
The US Department of Health and Human Services and
the US Department of Agriculture have declared three
categories of biological agents that have ‘the potential to
pose a severe threat to health and safety’. These agents are
called Biological Select Agents or Toxins, and are divided
into three categories: (i) those that affect only humans; (ii)
those that affect only animals or crops; and (iii) and
those that overlap and affect both (http://www.
selectagents.gov/).
The US CDC recognizes three categories of bioterrorism
agent [12]. Category A includes the highest-priority agents,
which pose a risk to national security because of the following
features:
1. They can be easily disseminated or transmitted per-
son-to-person, causing secondary and tertiary cases.
2. They cause high mortality with the potential to have a major
public health impact, including the impact on healthcare
facilities.
3. They may cause public panic and social disruption.
4. They require special action for public health preparedness.
A number of organisms and toxins are presented in Table 1,
e.g. anthrax, plague, smallpox, botulinum toxin, and ricin. The
properties, pathogenic mechanisms and medical countermea-
sures against them have been well described in the past [2,22–
42]. The agents in Table 1 are selected because they have
either been weaponized for warfare purposes or have been
actually used in bioterrorism. These agents are likely to cause
the most signiﬁcant impact, and could be considered to be the
most suited. However, this is not to say that agents that are
not on the list are entirely harmless, only that they are less
suitable. Listing agents as in Table 1 is useful to create an
overview for, for example, focusing research priorities or
other aims; it should not lead to too many agent-speciﬁc
measures and a false sense of security if countermeasures
were to be developed solely against a speciﬁc set. Generic
measures strengthening public health, bio-preparedness and
biosecurity, with agent-speciﬁc measures ﬁlling in the gaps,
would probably be most cost-effective. Many pathogens may
be used for bioterrorism in one way or another, and the
popularity of ricin suggests that terrorists tend to use
something that is, ﬁrst of all, accessible.
Examples of Bioterrorism
The study of the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism lists 74 separate
incidents involving biological agents during 1990–2011 [43].
Carus [13] reports 153 incidents in the period 1990–1999
alone (Table 2), and the trends depicted there seem to have
continued well throughout the ﬁrst decade of the new
millennium. However, many of these are biocrime-related,
and are not taken into account by the National Consortium for
the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism report.
What is clear is that bioterrorism is hardly a new phenom-
enon, and that the numbers of attempts and attacks have
increased signiﬁcantly since 1989. Fortunately, most of these
attacks failed, and caused neither deaths nor casualties.
In 1984, 751 people fell ill in The Dalles, Oregon, USA, in
two successive waves after eating at salad bars. None of the
casualties died. Proper outbreak investigation quickly deter-
mined the disease to be salmonellosis caused by Salmonella
typhimurium, and identiﬁed four salad bars in the ﬁrst wave and
ten restaurants in the second wave as the origins of infection.
What was not established by the health authorities at the time,
and was only revealed by accident much later in 1986, was how
the salad bars became contaminated in the ﬁrst place. It turned
out that the Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh cult had purposefully
contaminated the assorted salad bars with Salmonella cultures
in order to inﬂuence local elections, in a bid for power [44,45].
This demonstrates the difﬁculties in detecting a biological
attack if agents and methods are used that mimic the accidental
food-poisoning outbreaks that happen regularly, and if other
indicators that raise awareness and suspicion are absent or not
taken into account.
In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo sect disseminated sarin in a
coordinated attack on ﬁve trains of the Tokyo metro system,
in an effort to ultimately start an apocalyptic war, from which
the sect was meant to emerge as rulers of Japan and possibly
even the world [46]. The attack resulted in 12 deaths and at
least 1400 people being injured. An earlier attack in 1994, using
sarin in Matsumoto, central Japan, resulted in seven deaths and
200 people being injured. At the time, the cult had several
thousand members and assets worth millions of dollars,
including a sheep farm in Australia for ﬁeld testing. Its chemists
were able to synthesize sarin and VX nerve agent gases, among
other agents, by themselves. Only in 1998 did the authorities
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learn that the cult had previously tried to attack metropolitan
Tokyo with anthrax spores or botulinum toxin on at least
eight different occasions in the period 1990–1995. All of these
attempts failed, owing to the use of non-pathogenic prepara-
tions and technical difﬁculties in creating an aerosol [8,47].
Apparently, even if considerable ﬁnancial, structural and
logistical resources are available, successfully delivering a
large-scale biological attack is harder than it may seem to be.
In the autumn of 2001, a series of letters containing anthrax
spores were sent by mail to US senators, journalists, and
media buildings. In the process, 22 people were seriously
injured, ﬁve of whom died, and probably thousands were
contaminated and advised to use antibiotics for an extended
period of time. Forensic research ultimately implicated a
former US research scientist, but his suicide prevented a
satisfactory end to the investigation [48,49]. It must be noted
that, although the number of clinical cases may have been small
as compared with other diseases of public health concern, the
impact on society was nevertheless very signiﬁcant. At the
time, there was much anxiety and stress [50], and the direct
and indirect costs related to the investigation, clean-up and
installation of detection equipment, scanning mail and other
measures to prevent further attacks were high. Furthermore,
the quality of life of those involved at the time has been badly
affected [51]. To this day, powder letters are a regular
phenomenon worldwide, usually containing hoax materials,
but occasionally containing other toxic materials such as ricin
[21,43]. The risk perception of events that are out of the
ordinary usually results in an impact that goes beyond the
mere number of casualties. In addition, communities and
individuals involved in biological and chemical events may
suffer from psychological effects, some of which are acute, and
some of which are delayed in onset [52]. Bioterrorism falls in
this category of events, and (bio)terrorism preparedness
measures should take this into account.
Roxas-Duncan and Smith [21] described >20 bioterrorist
attempts and attacks involving the use of ricin in the period
1990–2011. Ricin can be obtained from castor plant beansT
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TABLE 2. Trends in bio-agent cases 1900–1999 (modiﬁed
from Carus [13])
Decade Bioterrorist Biocriminal Other/uncertain Total
1990–1999 19 40 94 153
1980–1989 3 6 0 9
1970–1979 3 2 3 8
1960–1969 0 1 0 1
1950–1959 1 0 0 1
1940–1949 1 0 0 1
1930–1939 0 3 0 3
1920–1929 0 0 0 0
1910–1919 0 3 0 3
1900–1909 0 1 0 1
Totals 7 56 97 180
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(Ricinus communis), and these can be easily and legally
purchased. Ricin is a highly toxic compound, and there is no
effective antidote. Attempts involving ricin usually generate a
high media proﬁle. These reasons might be sufﬁcient to explain
the seeming popularity of ricin. In addition, the use of ricin may
be an indication that the tightening of regulations on agents of
concern and increases in other biosecurity measures have
made it much more difﬁcult for many individuals to obtain
these materials.
Trends in Bioterrorism
So far, bioterrorism has claimed few lives as compared with
the more traditional forms of terrorism using guns and
explosives. The risk that use of the infectious agents as
selected in Table 1 will result in casualties is real, but also
should not be overestimated. For example, natural variations
in incubation period, as can be seen from Table 1, will usually
allow for diagnosis before the peak of symptomatic cases for
most of the agents (and the longer the incubation period, the
more this is so). Then, unless a multiresistant but highly
aggressive ‘superbug’ is envisaged, effective antibiotics are
available for the majority of bacterial agents at least. Never-
theless, there is some reason for concern that future
bioterrorism attacks may be more effective than incidents in
the past. Terrorists will usually use readily available weapons,
but some also will keep trying to adopt tactics to inﬂict mass
casualties to achieve ideological, revenge or religious goals.
Sects such as Aum Shinrikyo have tried to master the method
of aerosol dissemination of biological agents. Al-Qaida sought
to acquire biological weapons [53]. Many of its assets in
Afghanistan may have been destroyed in the past decade, but
its aims and motivation have probably not changed. Also,
because of increasing technological innovation and sophistica-
tion of equipment, and the proliferation of knowledge through
the Internet across the world, equipment has become cheaper,
smaller, and easier to operate, and methods have become
easier to execute. What once required an expensive labora-
tory may now be done by a skilled individual in a garage, and
will be difﬁcult to prevent or detect. Laboratories have
oversight mechanisms, colleagues peering in, and preventive
measures in place to protect workers and the environment
against inadvertent releases, but this is not the case in the
do-it-yourself (DIY)-type garage box biology. Beyond doubt, in
almost all cases the ingenuity and creativity displayed by these
researchers and engineers is fully transparent within the
community, and will be applied for beneﬁcial purposes.
Ultimately, it may result in biofuel-producing bacteria, lighting
from luminescent microorganisms, or even biological comput-
ers [54]. The dual-use nature of life sciences technology and
the diffusion of advanced technological capabilities could
facilitate the development of a biological weapon, including
mechanisms for effective dissemination. However, it must also
be noted that, although equipment and techniques have
become more readily available, considerable skills and exper-
tise are still required to carry out this kind of DIY research
[55]. The likelihood of rogue individuals carrying out DIY
biology is real, but small. Self-regulation and transparency of
DIY biology research should be encouraged. Possibly more
disturbing for the future, some terrorists might gain access to
the expertise and or agents generated by a state-directed BW
programme. Civil war, revolt and lawlessness in countries
possessing such a BW programme would cause a signiﬁcant
proliferation risk.
On the bright side, the technological innovations and rapid
advances in life sciences have greatly increased our under-
standing of the ways in which pathogens interact with the host,
and have stimulated the development of medical countermea-
sures. It must be stated that the beneﬁts for society provided
by these advances far outweigh the potential adverse effects.
Also, they have greatly increased our abilities to detect and
identify pathogens in a timely manner. At the same time,
technological advances such as networked video cameras and
software designed to identify important intelligence informa-
tion have become powerful tools for counterterrorism
operations, and have increased the effectiveness of antiter-
rorism countermeasures in order to prevent attacks. In the
USA, the majority of bioterrorism attempts [21,43] were
foiled in the early stages, indicating the success of the
surveillance and counterterrorism activities. Technological
advances have resulted in an increase in our forensic ability
to investigate an incident and track down the origins.
Conclusions
Bioterrorism or BW is neither something new, nor something
that is likely to go away. The likelihood of a successful
bioterrorist attack is not very large, given the technical
difﬁculties and constraints resulting from the need to work in
secret, and more probably at the low-technology end of the
spectrum than the high-technology end. However, even if the
number of casualties is likely to be limited, the impact of a
bioterrorist attack can still be high, will affect many lives, and is
certainly to be costly in direct and indirect ways. Thus, it is best
to be prepared to deal with the consequences. Measures aimed
at enhancing public health in, among other areas, diagnostics,
including microbial identiﬁcation and typing, surveillance,
generic antimicrobial therapeutics and therapeutics to over-
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come drug resistance, training and education will both enhance
the ability of society to combat ‘regular’ infectious disease
outbreaks and mitigate the effects of bioterrorist attacks. Such
an approach is likely to be the most cost-effective.
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